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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the determinants of the decision to relocate activities abroad for 
firms that are located in 29 OECD countries. Our theoretical model suggests that firm 
heterogeneity plays a crucial role for the link between employment protection and 
relocation. Stricter employment protection laws in the home country discourages firms’ 
relocation activity. While larger, more productive firms and firms with higher labour 
intensities have, ceteris paribus, higher propensities to relocate, these firms also face 
higher exit barriers if the country from which they consider relocating has strict 
employment protection laws.  Our theoretical predictions are supported empirically, with 
consistent results for firms operating in the manufacturing sector.   
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1.  Introduction 
Discussions on the effects of firm flexibility remain −in spite of the vast literature on the 
topic− prominent, both in the academic literature and among policy makers.  One factor 
that affects firm flexibility that has been discussed recently is the institutional 
environment, and more specifically, labour market regulations.  Employment protection 
legislation (EPL) in particular is seen as an important source of firm inflexibility as it 
causes firms to incur adjustment costs in the form of redundancy payments whenever 
workers are laid off.  It is well established that the firing costs implied by EPL lowers a 
firm’s flexibility: when EPL is high, it is costly to fire workers and hence employment 
responses to shocks and/or the business cycle are smaller (see, for instance, Bertola and 
Rogerson, 1997; Garibaldi, 1998; Messina and Vallanti, 2007).  Also, EPL gives firms an 
incentive to limit changes in output (see, for instance, Bertola et al., 2010).  
It is therefore not surprising that there exists a sizeable body of work studying the 
effect of EPL on a firm’s decision to enter a market.  This is particularly relevant for 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), which consider multiple host countries as potential 
production locations.1
                                                 
1 Comprehensive reviews of the literature on determinants of FDI and multinational production are 
provided by Blonigen (2005) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).   
  The empirical evidence provided by the literature generally shows 
that multinationals prefer locations with low levels of labour market regulation (Javorcik 
and Spatareanu, 2005, Olney, 2011).  Work examining the link between employment 
protection legislation and foreign direct investment (FDI) presents evidence of the 
negative effect of employment protection on inward FDI (e.g., Nicoletti et al, 2003, and 
Görg, 2005).  Hence, EPL is shown to act as a barrier to entry for international firms in 
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potential host countries. The advantage offered by flexible labour markets is clear:  they 
allow multinationals to hire and fire easily, thus enabling them to adjust production easily 
to changes in economic conditions.2
 What has been largely neglected in this literature is the fact that 
multinationals may not only care about the state of labour market regulations in the host, 
but also in the home country.
  
3
Although EPL as an institutional barrier to exit from a given location has received 
scant attention in the literature,
  Our paper focuses on how firms are affected by labour 
market regulations at home and examines more specifically to what extent EPL acts as a 
barrier to relocation.  In other words, we study the extent to which EPL is a barrier to exit.  
In the spirit of Stigler’s (1968) definition of entry barriers, Geroski et al. (1990) define an 
exit barrier as a cost that a firm must bear in order to leave a market (not borne by firms 
that are not yet established in the market or by established firms that have not chosen to 
leave the market).   
4
                                                 
2 Examples of theoretical work that features the effect of employment protection on the location decision of 
firms are given by Haaland et al. (2002) , who discuss this issue for a monopolist firm, and Dewit et al. 
(2013), who focus on the interaction of firms’ location decisions in an oligopolistic framework. 
 it matters in the real world for both firms and 
governments.  If firms considering relocation are hindered in that decision by significant 
EPL-induced exit costs, their internationalisation strategy may be inhibited.  At the same 
time, less or slower relocation resulting from strict EPL may be good news for 
governments of those countries with strict EPL: less firm relocation implies a lower 
burden in terms of the social adjustment cost potentially accompanying firm relocation.  
3 As far as we are aware, Dewit et al. (2009) are one of the few studies that examine the potential role of 
employment protection legislation hindering outward FDI.  Based on a theoretical model, they show that 
employment protection in the home country does indeed affect aggregate bilateral FDI flows between 
countries. 
4 From an empirical analysis based on online-survey data on national barriers to exit in general, Burmester  
(2011) suggests political and strategic exit barriers from the origin nation are significant inhibitors to 
relocation of FDI.  
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This is especially relevant in an era in which multinational firms have become 
increasingly footloose, leaving some countries with a rapidly eroding industrial base.5  In 
fact, the debate on relocation remains intense on either side of the Atlantic, both among 
academics and policy makers.6
In examining to what extent EPL acts as a barrier to relocation, we pay particular 
attention to firm heterogeneity.  Although EPL is de jure not industry specific, there is 
good reason to believe that industries are de facto not equally affected by a country’s 
EPL.  In fact, it is unlikely that firms in the same industry will be affected equally.  Firm 
heterogeneity in relation to location decisions has received more attention in recent years, 
thanks to the increased availability of firm-level data-sets and a seminal paper by 
Helpman et al. (2004). We contribute to this literature by examining how employment 
protection changes the propensity to relocate of firms with different characteristics.
 
7  
Relocation has been particularly relevant in manufacturing8
                                                 
5 The literature offers several examples of government policy that has contributed to or has tried to prevent 
relocation by firms.  For instance, Motta and Thisse (1994) investigate whether a strict environmental 
policy may cause firms to relocate, and Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2002) examine how the EU’s structural 
funds affect firm and industry relocation. 
 and was −as suggested by 
survey data− mainly motivated by low labour costs abroad (European Commission, 
2012).   
6 See for instance −among numerous reports on relocation− the report commissioned by the European 
Parliament on the relocalisation of EU industry (2007) and the book by Bhagwati et al. (2009) discussing 
offhoring of American jobs. 
7 Examples of theoretical work on location decisions of heterogeneous firms are Baldwin and Okubo (2006) 
and Okubo et al. (2008).  These papers analyse how heterogeneous firms self-select in different host 
countries.  In an empirical study, Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2000) investigate the determinants of firm 
relocation for firms located in Belgium.  Other empirical work includes Aw and Lee (2008) and Chen and 
Moore (2010), who study the location decisions of French and Taiwanese multinationals, respectively.  
None of these studies look at the effect of EPL in the home country on firms’ relocation decisions. 
8 Cohen (2005) and Amiti and Wei (2005) point out that relocation in services is increasing but remains 
low.  Blinder (2007), however, perceives the observed increase in relocation in services more as a threat to 
jobs in the source country. 
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With this in mind, we construct a simple theoretical framework modelling a firm’s 
relocation decision.  We first discuss a benchmark without employment protection and 
show that firms with different characteristics also differ in their propensity to relocate: 
larger, more productive and more labour-intensive firms have a higher propensity to 
relocate than their smaller, less productive and more capital-intensive counterparts.  
Second, we show that if there is employment protection in the source country of the 
multinational firm, its propensity to relocate falls.  This reduction in its propensity to 
relocate is largest the larger, more productive or more labour-intensive the firm is.  
Hence, our model predicts that employment protection tends to make heterogeneous 
firms more similar in terms of their propensity to relocate.   
We then test our theoretical predictions, using firm level data in 29 OECD 
countries for the period 1997-2007. We do this by merging an annual employment 
protection index with two firm-level datasets to identify firms that reduce their operations 
at home (via selling or closing/dissolving part of their company) and at the same time 
open up new foreign affiliates or acquire existing firms abroad.  Our results are broadly in 
line with the theoretical predictions as outlined above, but only hold for firms in 
manufacturing, not in services.  This seems to be in line with the observation that 
relocation in services, although increasing, is overall much lower than in manufacturing 
and heavily concentrated in a handful of service activities.9
In Section 2, we set up a theoretical framework that models the relocation 
decision of a firm and examines how specific firm-characteristics affect that decision.  In 
  
                                                 
9 Cohen (2005) points out that relocation in services remains marginal and predominantly applies to call 
centres and low-skilled jobs in IT-support.  This is in line with case-study evidence reported in the 
European Restructuring Monitor Report (2007).  Blinder (2007), however, perceives the observed increase 
in relocation in services as a potential threat to jobs in the source country.  
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Section 3, we present an empirical model that allows us to test our theoretical predictions.  
Section 4 reports our results and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. A simple theoretical model  
Consider a monopolist firm, producing for an integrated market.  There are two periods.  
In period one, the firm observes demand for that period, which is given by 
11 qap −= ,          (1) 
but faces uncertainty about demand in period two, which is resolved at the start of period 
two.  With probability ρ , demand in period two is the same as in period one: 
22 qap −= .          (2a) 
With the complementary probability ρ−1 , a permanent positive demand shock occurs in 
period two10
ε+−= 22 qap
, in which case period-two demand is: 
.         (2b) 
In expressions (1)-(2b), tp  denotes the price in period t ( 2,1=t ) and tq  stands for 
period-t output; in expression (2b) ε  is the parameter that represents a permanent 
positive demand shock. 
There are two possible production locations, countries ‘Home’ (H) and ‘Foreign’ 
(F).  We assume that the firm’s production location in period one is country H and that 
the fixed cost of setting up a plant in H has been sunk, hence there are no fixed cost to be 
                                                 
10 It is straightforward to extend the model and include the possibility of negative demand shocks.  
However, since this does not alter the key message of the model, we have not included this possibility to 
keep the exposition as simple as possible (see the appendix in Dewit, Görg and Montagna (2009) for a 
related model with the possibility of a negative demand shock).  There is some evidence that firms relocate 
less during downturns (see the European Commission’s European Competitiveness Report 2012, p.62). 
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incurred in period one.11
Φ
  When uncertainty is resolved in period two, the firm chooses 
either to stay in country H or to relocate to country F.  Its costs depend on the production 
location.  If it does decide to produce in F in period two, it will incur a fixed cost of 
setting up a plant there (denoted by ).  The firm uses two factors of production, labour 
(l) and capital (k).    Respective wage rates in country H and F are Hw  and Fw , while Hr  
and Fr are the rental rates of capital in the respective locations; these local factor prices 
are exogenously given to the firm.  We assume that the F-country is relatively labour 
abundant, implying that labour in F is relatively cheap ( FFHH rwrw // > ).  The costs 
per unit of production in country H and F, Hc  and Fc , are given by: 
H
k
H
l
H rwc αα +=          (3a) 
and 
F
k
F
l
F rwc αα += ,         (3b) 
respectively;  parameters lα  and kα  stand for the unit factor requirements for labour and 
capital.  These are assumed to be identical across countries but firm-specific, with their 
reciprocals denoting the marginal productivity of labour and capital within the firm.12
tlt ql α=
  
Note that the firm’s workforce in period t is , whereas its capital is tkt qk α= , 
implying that its labour-capital rate is equal to kl αα / .  
 Apart from production costs, the firm incurs potential firing costs.  More 
specifically, in country H, there is employment protection regulation. As a result, firms 
producing in H incur firing costs if they reduce the number of workers.  Firing costs are 
                                                 
11 The firm could either be a domestic firm of country H or a multinational that previously decided to locate 
there. 
12 The cost specification is based on a Leontief production technology. 
 7 
represented by )( 21
HH
l
H qqI −αλ , where Hλ  is a parameter that captures the degree of 
employment protection (with higher values reflecting stricter employment protection); I 
is an indicator variable with 1=I   if HH qq 21 >  and 0=I  otherwise.  By contrast, there is 
no employment protection regulation in country F (i.e., 0=Fλ ).13
Let us now describe the firm’s decision sequence.  In stage one, the firm, located 
in country H, chooses its output level for period one, while facing uncertainty about 
period-two demand.  At the start of period two, period-two demand uncertainty is 
resolved and the firm decides whether or not to relocate to region F (stage two).  In the 
final stage (stage three), it chooses its period-two output level.  There are two possible 
dynamic location equilibria.  Using 
     
tH  and tF , respectively, to denote Home and 
Foreign as the chosen production location in time period t, we have ),( 21 HH , the 
equilibrium in which the firm stays in the initial production location, and ),( 21 FH , the 
equilibrium in which the firm relocates to the region without employment protection.  
Naturally, in practice, the equilibrium without relocation will occur most of the time since 
the firm would not have chosen H as its initial location otherwise.  However, since we 
want to analyse the relocation decisions of firms out of locations with employment 
protection, we will determine in the next section when the relocation equilibrium 
),( 21 FH  is likely to occur.   
 
Relocation and employment protection 
                                                 
13  It is straightforward to incorporate employment protection in Foreign, with FH λλ > .  This would raise 
the barrier to entry into Foreign and therefore reduce the attractiveness of that location.  As a result,  the 
firm’s propensity to relocate to Foreign would fall, but the qualitative relationship between the firm’s exit 
cost from Home from Home’s employment protection and that firm’s propensity to relocate to Foreign 
would remain unaltered. 
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Using backward induction, we first examine the firm’s location and production decisions in 
period two.  Subsequently, we solve for the firm’s production level in period one. 
In period two, the firm relocates if period-two profits from relocation, ),( 212 FHπ , 
exceed second-period profits from staying in country H, ),( 212 HHπ .  So, the firm’s 
relocation condition is: 
),(),( 212212 HHFH ππ > .        (4) 
If the monopolist relocates to F, it shuts down its plant in H, thus incurring 
employment protection induced exit costs, Hl
H q1αλ .
14
FH
l
HFF qqcpFH Φ−−−= 122212 )(),( αλπ
  In addition, the set-up costs of the 
new plant in country F have to be paid.  Hence, second-period profits in case of relocation 
are:  
      (5a) 
If, however, the firm decides to stay in H in period two, it occurs firing costs only 
if and to the extent that period-two output is lower than its period-one output level; its 
profit function is: 
)()(),( 2122212
HH
l
HHH qqIqcpHH −−−= αλπ .     (5b) 
A comparison of expressions (5a) and (5b) shows that HF cc <  is a necessary −but 
not sufficient− condition for relocation (i.e., for expression (4) to hold).  In order to express 
the actual relocation condition (expression (4)) in terms of the model’s parameters, we need 
to determine optimal period-two output levels for both locations (i.e., Fq2  and 
Hq2 ). 
                                                 
14 For simplicity, we abstract from partial relocation in the theoretical model.  Partial relocation would be 
obtained when, for instance, the production process exhibits increasing marginal costs.  Of course, real-
world relocation is typically partial, which is how we define relocation in the empirical model. However, 
partial relocation does not alter the qualitative relationship between relocation and employment protection 
and hence the sign predictions obtained from our theoretical model are applicable to partial as well as 
complete relocation.   
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 Let us first determine optimal second-period output levels for the case in which the 
firm decides (in stage two) to move production to F. Its optimal output level is then obtained 
by maximising expression (5a) with respect to Fq2 .  If period-two demand is the same as 
period-one demand, optimal period-two output is given by: 
22
F
F caq −= .          (6a) 
But, if the permanent positive demand shock occurs in period two, then optimal output is:  
22
ε+−
=
F
F caq .         (6b) 
Subsequently, we calculate the optimal second-period output level in the alternative 
case to relocation, which is staying in country H.  Then, the firm’s optimal output level is 
obtained by maximising expression (5b) with respect to Hq2  and is given by: 
22
l
HH
H Icaq αλ+−=         (7a) 
and 
22
εαλ ++−
= l
HH
H Icaq ,        (7b) 
when period-two demand is given by expression (2a) and (2b), respectively.   
We assume that, if period-two demand is the same as period-one demand, the firm 
will stay in the initially chosen location, H, since nothing that affects the firm’s relocation 
decision has changed.15
                                                 
15 If we were to incorporate a negative demand shock into our model and the firm was faced with a negative 
demand shock, it would a fortiori stay in country H.  While including the possibility of a negative demand 
shock in our model would lower the probability of relocation, it would not change the relocation condition 
in any qualitative way (for a similar model that includes the possibility of a negative demand shock, see the 
Appendix in Dewit et al. (2009)).  For simplicity, we here ignore the possibility of a negative demand 
shock. 
  Hence, only if there is a positive demand shock in period two, i.e., 
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the case in which demand is given by expression (2b), is relocation effectively a possible 
option. Focussing on this case, we rewrite the relocation condition (expression (4)) by 
substituting expressions (6b) and (7b) into expressions (5a) and (5b) and obtain: 
H
l
HF
F
l
HH
l
HHF
qIcIcIcaca 1
22
)1(
2
)(
4
)()(
αλ
αλεαλ
−+Φ>
−−
+
+−−−
. (8) 
So, with FH cc > , relocation is possible and, ceteris paribus, more likely if the 
positive demand shock is large; a large value for ε  widens the difference between 
prospective operating profits in F and H  (that is, the left-hand-side of the inequality in 
(8) increases). If there were no employment protection in H ( 0=Hλ ), the firm would 
relocate to country F provided that the gap in operating profits between F and H is wide 
enough to compensate for the entry costs ( FΦ ) associated with relocation.  However, 
given that there is employment protection in country H ( 0>Hλ ), a firm that considers 
relocating faces firing costs and hence exit costs from country H (captured by the second 
term of the right-hand-side of the inequality in (8)). So, relative to the case in which there 
is no employment protection in H, the gap in operating profits between F and H now 
needs to be wider for the firm to relocate to country F in order to compensate for the 
additional exit costs associated with relocation. 
We now turn to period-one output.  Since we want to focus on the relocation 
equilibrium ( 21, FH ), we assume that condition (8) is met: a demand boom, if it occurs, is 
assumed to be sufficiently large to cause relocation.  In stage one, the firm determines its 
optimal period-one output level, knowing that it may relocate in period two.  It chooses 
Hq1  by maximising expected profit ( πE ), with: 
2121
221 )1(
FHHHE πρρπππ −++=        (9) 
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and HH qcp 111 )( −=π .  Maximising expression (9) with respect to 
Hq1  yields: 
2
)1(
1
l
H
l
HH
H Icaq αρλαλρ −−−−= .      (10) 
First of all, comparing expressions (10) and (7a) shows HH qq 21 < ; hence 0=I  in 
expressions (7a), (7b), (8) and (10).  Second, expression (10) shows that the firm, when 
deciding its production level in period one, takes into account that it may want to relocate 
in period two by restricting its first-period output somewhat (reflected by 
2/)1( l
Hαλρ−−  ) in order to limit future exit costs in case of relocation. 
Having fully solved the model, let us now rewrite the relocation condition in (8), 
using 0=I , as:    
H
L
HF
FHHF
qcccaca 1
22
2
)(
4
)()( αλε +Φ>−+−−−     (11) 
Thus, ceteris paribus, an increase in marginal production cost in H or a decrease 
in marginal production costs in F raises the operating profits from relocation and hence 
the propensity to relocate.  An increase in fixed costs for entering F raises the entry cost 
in the prospective new location and hence lowers the propensity to relocate.  Importantly, 
an increase in the degree of employment protection in H raises exit costs from H, which 
tends to lower a firm’s propensity to relocate from H.16
Figure 1 illustrates the firm’s propensity to relocate as a function of the degree of 
employment protection in country H.  Along the depicted locus, the firm is indifferent 
between relocating to F or staying in H (
 
),(),( 212212 HHFH ππ = ).  More specifically, 
                                                 
16 We have 0/)( 1 >
HH
l
H dqd λαλ  provided that the probability of relocation is not too high compared to 
the first-period output of the firm (i.e., HHca λρ 2/)(1 −<− ).  We assume this to be the case to ensure the 
firm wanted to produce in Home as its initial location. 
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the locus represents the critical level of fixed entry costs into F, FΦ , at which 
),(),( 212212 HHFH ππ =  for varying levels of employment protection, 
Hλ .  Below the 
locus, condition (8) is met, meaning that the firm will relocate.  Above the curve, the 
relocation condition in (8) is violated and hence the firm will not relocate.  As the degree 
of employment protection in country H increases, the firm’s propensity to relocate falls, 
which is reflected in the negative slope of the ),(),( 212212 HHFH ππ = -locus. 
 
 
 
 
Firm-specific characteristics, employment protection and relocation 
In this section we ask how firm-specific differences affect a firm’s propensity to relocate.  
As we are particularly interested in the effect of employment protection on relocation, we 
focus on those firm characteristics that affect the exit costs from country H, induced by 
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employment protection: firm size, productivity and labour intensity.  Using comparative 
statics, we examine how a firm’s propensity to relocate is affected by a change in one of 
these firm attributes.  In order to do this, it proves convenient to define HH caA −≡  and 
FF caA −≡ , where HF AA θ=  with 1>θ  (as mentioned earlier, HF cc < , implying 
HF AA > , is a necessary condition for relocation).  Note that, since unit factor 
requirements, lα  and kα , are firm-specific, 
Hc  and  Fc and hence HA  and FA  are firm-
specific too. 
First, we examine how firm size affects a firm’s propensity to relocate.  HA  can 
be interpreted as a determinant of firm size in period one.  Also, since HA  is inversely 
related to the average variable cost of production, HA could, alternatively, be viewed as 
an indicator of firm productivity.  We start by examining the effect of an increase in HA
on the condition in (11) when there is no employment protection in country H  (i.e., at 
0=Hλ ).  In that case, a change in HA  only affects the left-hand side of the inequality.  
Using HF AA θ= , the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to HA  is equal to 
)(
2
)1( εθ +− HA , which is positive (since 1>θ ).  So, in the absence of employment 
protection, larger −more productive− firms have a higher propensity to relocate.17
0>Hλ
  
However, from the previous subsection, we know that employment protection in H (
) will lower the propensity to relocate of firms located in H.  Here we ask whether 
and to what extent employment protection affects the exit costs of firms differentially.   
Exit costs are represented by Hl
H q1αλ , on the right-hand side of the inequality in (11).  
                                                 
17 This is consistent with the result found in Helpman et al. (2004) that only the most productive firms 
engage in FDI as only they make sufficient operating profit to cover the fixed cost of FDI. 
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We have 02//)( 1 >= l
HHH
l
H dAqd αλαλ .  This implies that, ceteris paribus, larger and 
more productive firms have higher exit costs from a country with high employment 
protection than their smaller and less productive counterparts, which mitigate their 
relatively higher potential gains from relocation.  This suggests that employment 
protection tends to narrow the differences in the propensity to relocate between large and 
small firms and between very productive and less productive firms.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 2, which depicts the critical fixed entry cost into country F ( FΦ ) for which a firm 
is indifferent between relocation and no relocation ( ),(),( 212212 HHFH ππ = ) as a 
function of firm size.  For different degrees of employment protection, the slope of the 
locus along which ),(),( 212212 HHFH ππ =  is much smaller as the degree of employment 
protection increases, reflecting the fact that the difference between small and large firms 
in terms of their propensity to relocate shrinks as λ rises in the country in which the firms 
are initially located.  
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Next, we take a closer look at the effect of labour intensity on a firm’s propensity 
to relocate.  To isolate the labour intensity from the firm productivity effect, we compare 
the propensity to relocate for home firms that are equally productive, or, have the same 
marginal production costs ( Hc ) −and, in our model, thus have the same size, HA −, but 
operate with different relative labour intensities (denoted by klkl αα // = ).  An increase 
in firm-specific labour intensity that leaves Hc  unaffected implies 
0)/(/ =+= Hlk
H
l
H rddwddc ααα , which in turn implies HHlk rwdd // −=αα . 
 We first determine how such an increase in relative labour intensity of the firm 
affects its potential gains from relocation (which are captured by the left-hand side of 
expression (11)).  Differentiating the left-hand side of the inequality in (11) with respect 
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to lα  (while keeping 
Hc  constant) yields 2/)]/()[( HHFFF rwrwA −+− ε .  As country 
F was assumed to be relatively labour abundant (i.e., FFHH rwrw // > ), we have  
0)]/()[( >−+− HHFFF rwrwA ε , meaning that the gains of relocation from countries 
that are relatively capital-abundant (i.e., where labour is relatively expensive) is higher 
for more labour intensive firms.  Turning to the costs from relocation (captured by the 
right-hand side of the inequality in (11)), we focus on the effect of labour intensity on the 
exit cost of relocation.   Employment protection in the country from where the firm 
considers relocation raises exit costs ( Hl
H q1αλ ) and these exit costs are higher the more 
labour intensive the firm is (i.e., the higher lα ).  So, among equally productive, equally 
sized firms, we expect that highly labour-intensive firms gain most from relocation, while 
at the same time being  hindered most in their relocation decision if they face high levels 
of employment protection in the country from which they consider relocation.  Thus, we 
expect that the difference in relocation propensity between firms with a high and a low 
labour intensity will be narrowed by employment protection.  Figure 3 illustrates this.  As 
a firm’s labour intensity rises, its propensity to relocate increases (indicated by the fact 
that the ),(),( 212212 HHFH ππ = -locus is positively sloped), but this increase is 
significantly dampened if the degree of employment protection in country H is high. 
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3. Empirical evidence 
Empirical Model 
The above discussion of the theoretical model provides a number of testable hypotheses 
which we investigate in the remainder of the paper: 
1. The level of employment protection in the home country is negatively 
associated with the relocation decision of the firms that produce there.   
While this is, per se, not surprising, taking into account firm heterogeneity provides a 
more complex set of hypotheses: 
2. Firm size, productivity and labour intensity affect a firm’s propensity to 
relocate positively.   
3. Employment protection lowers the propensity to relocate for large firms more 
than for small firms, for highly productive firms more than for less productive 
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firms, and more for firms with a high labour intensity than for those with a low 
labour intensity.   
In order to check the empirical validity or otherwise of these theoretically derived 
hypotheses, we propose to estimate the propensity to relocate for firm i, Pr(D)it , 
conditional on a set of covariates.  Specifically, in order to examine hypotheses 1 to 3 we 
estimate equations 
Pr(D)it = β1 λht + β2 Cit + β3 (λht * Cit) + β4 X it + ε it    (12) 
where λht is the level of employment protection in firm i’s home country h at time t.  Cit 
is, alternatively, the size, productivity or labour intensity of firm i at time t and Xit is a 
vector of control variables.  The model also includes full sets of industry, year and 
country dummies.  Hypotheses 1 to 3 imply β1 < 0, β2 > 0 and β3 < 0.   
 
Data description 
The empirical model described in equations (12) is estimated using firm level data 
on the location decisions of firms from 29 OECD home countries.  Our data covers both 
the manufacturing and services sector.  While the theoretical model was set up with the 
production processes in the manufacturing sector in mind, we also conduct the empirical 
analysis for services to see whether or not similar conclusions can be drawn for relocating 
firms in service sectors. 
The dataset is collected from ORBIS, which is a comprehensive and rich firm-
level dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk.18
                                                 
18 BvD is a leading electronic publisher of annual account information on private and public firms around 
the world.  For further details regarding the data, including access issues, see www.bvdep.com. 
  Bureau van Dijk collects financial, 
economic and other firm-level information from various sources, including official bodies 
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such as Companies House in the UK and similar commercial and official registries in 
other countries.  Our sample includes an unbalanced panel of firms in 29 OECD countries 
for the period 1997-2007.  We have information on the characteristics of the firms, such 
as location, output, employment, labour intensity, productivity, industry classification on 
an annual basis, and we can crucially observe whether they have reduced their operations 
at home and at the same time set up affiliates abroad.   
A “relocation” in our empirical analysis is defined as a firm reducing their 
operations at home by more than 10 per cent of their size (measured in number of 
employees) and at the same time opening up a new foreign affiliate or acquire an existing 
firm abroad; similar to Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2000).  The establishment of the 
foreign affiliate is based on the date of incorporation of the foreign affiliate which is also 
available in the data set.  A firm owns a foreign affiliate if it holds at least 10 percent of 
the voting stocks.19
We use two-digit primary NACE industry Codes to distinguish firms in the 
manufacturing sector (i.e. NACE 15-37) and the services sector (i.e. NACE 50-74).  
Since our analysis is based on registered firms and their filed accounts, all large firms as 
  Since a firm may have more than one foreign affiliate and therefore 
qualifies potentially as having carried out more than one relocation, we construct the 
dataset in bilateral form.  
                                                 
19 ORBIS reports firm accounts in either consolidated or unconsolidated form.  We include only 
unconsolidated accounts as they represent the domestic activities of firms and exclude any information 
from affiliates at home or abroad.  In contrast, consolidated accounts aggregate the activities of all firms 
belonging to a group worldwide, regardless of location and industrial affiliation.  
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well as a significant share of small and medium sized firms are included in the database, 
which provides a good coverage across OECD countries.20
Annual data on employment protection are obtained from the World 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum.
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The index is defined in such a way that a higher value reflects a more protected 
labour environment. In other words, λ is scaled such that a higher index refers to a higher 
degree of employment protection.  Hence, a negative sign of the relevant coefficient will 
indicate that higher labour protection hinders relocation (β1 < 0), as expected from the 
theoretical discussion.   
  This is an index that is 
constructed from extensive surveys of managers in 138 countries, conducted by the 
World Economic Forum. In the survey, participants are asked to give a score to a number 
of questions describing the overall business climate and competitiveness of the country in 
which the firm operates. The scale of this index for the period 1997-2007 ranges from 1 
to 7. The particular criterion for the index used here is: “Hiring and firing practices are 
too restricted by government or are flexible enough”.  
We measure a firm’s size by its number of employees. Labour intensity is 
measured by the ratio of labour to capital. We measure productivity by estimating total 
factor productivity using the now common method by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), 
which controls for endogeneity in inputs.  
Other firm level controls that may be correlated with the propensity to relocate are 
a firm’s average wage level and intangible assets.  Higher wages faced by firms at home 
                                                 
20 Desai et al. (2003) discuss data collection by Bureau van Dijk and conclude that, across countries, the 
database represents economies quite well.  Klapper et al. (2004) also point to its large coverage compared 
to other data sources. 
21 Similar data were used by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) and Amiti and Wakelin (2003).   
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increase the likelihood for them to consider relocation options abroad (as suggested by an 
increase in Hc  in the theoretical model).  Intangible assets are used as in (imperfect) 
indicator of firm-specific assets (Markusen, 1995), with higher levels of intangible to 
total assets increasing a firm’s likelihood of moving abroad via relocation, in order to 
reap the benefits of its firm specific advantages. 
As each OECD member country has its own institutional environment in which 
firms operate, we control for some of the time varying country-level differences by 
including the corporate tax rate in the home country, as one of the main macroeconomic 
variables determining firm location and relocation (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). We 
expect that the higher the tax rate in the home country, the higher the likelihood of firms 
to move abroad.   
Finally, since we not only know the home country of the investor but also the 
destination country to which the relocation takes place, we include in the empirical 
specification the level of employment protection in the destination country as an 
additional covariate.  This allows us to interpret the effect of the home level of 
employment protection for a given level of protection in the host country.  The definition 
and sources of all variables included in the model is provided in the appendix. 
Table 1 shows the coverage of OECD firms that either relocate or not, at some 
point during our sample period 1997-2007. The majority of relocating firms are based in 
Europe and North America with significant numbers from Eastern Europe as well as 
Japan and South Korea. These multinational firms invest heavily in other developed or 
OECD countries; only around 16 per cent of affilates are located outside the OECD (i.e. 
11,240 out of 69,948).  Since relocation is quite a drastic decision, it is not surprising that 
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firms that actually relocate make up a small proportion of all firms. In other words, 
column one shows that the number of firms that do not relocate within the period 1997-
2007 is much higher than the number of firms that relocate in almost every OECD 
country. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Relocation across OECD countries (1997-2007) 
 Employment 
protection 
index 
Number of firms 
not relocating 
Number of Firms 
that relocate 
No of affiliates 
located in: 
Austria 3.69 2,498 165 1,541 
Australia 3.61 102 2 147 
Belgium 4.37 2,531 416 915 
Canada 2.59 1,390 21 941 
Switzerland 1.74 3,745 178 1,275 
Czech Republic 3.22 519 98 2,662 
Germany 4.78 4,433 362 9,855 
Denmark 1.67 1,418 33 666 
Estonia 2.74 228 69 572 
Spain 4.14 4,014 579 4,836 
Finland 3.58 733 174 527 
France 4.65 4,495 576 3,924 
Great Britain 2.51 1,907 403 9,367 
Greece 4.24 92 2 275 
Hungary 2.69 107 4 385 
Ireland 3.58 242 10 1,253 
Italy 4.57 3,469 906 3,246 
Japan 3.45 640 85 412 
Korea 3.24 86 19 199 
Luxembourg 3.75 87 9 918 
Mexico 3.52 69 5 719 
Netherlands 4.10 5,850 607 2,867 
Norway 4.41 910 101 1,123 
Poland 3.40 195 7 3,457 
Portugal 4.23 421 30 866 
Sweden 4.57 2,440 453 1,000 
Slovenia 4.31 148 40 250 
Slovakia 2.95 290 30 661 
United States 1.86 3,167 39 3,075 
RoW (non-OECD)  -- -- 11,240 
Total  46,226 5,423 69,948 
Source: Authors calculations using Orbis. 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the key variables that characterise 
relocating firms and firms which do not relocate, for the manufacturing and services 
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sector separately.22
 
  They suggest that manufacturing firms are on average larger, more 
labour-intensive, and more productive than services firms.  Distinguishing relocating 
from non-relocating firms shows that, in manufacturing, we find that the former are 
“better” in terms of most aspects of firm characteristics measured, namely larger and 
more productive, but − somewhat surprisingly − less labour intensive.  The differences 
between these two groups of firms in the services sector seem much less pronounced. For 
this reason, we estimate the empirical model separately for manufacturing and services.   
Table 2: Summary Statistics of firm-level variables 
Variable (definition) Relocating Firms 
 
Mean 
(std. Dev.) 
Non – Relocating Firms 
 
Mean 
(std. Dev.) 
High-tech Manufacturing sector   
Number of employees 1114 
(3033) 
533 
(3124) 
Log Labour-intensity -3.88 
(1.76) 
-3.35 
(1.35) 
Log TFP 5.18 
(0.80) 
4.82 
(0.62) 
Low-tech Manufacturing sector   
Number of employees 677 392 
 (1867) (2556) 
Log Labour-intensity -4.25 -3.67 
 (1.80) (1.29) 
Log TFP 4.92 4.72 
 (0.81) (0.60) 
Services sector   
Number of employees 389 
(2293)  
343 
(3779)  
Log Labour-intensity -3.61 
(2.63) 
-3.03 
(2.13) 
Log TFP 7.82 
(2.00) 
7.55 
(1.84) 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Orbis database.  
 
                                                 
22 We distinguish manufacturing into high- and low-tech, based on the standard OECD classification 
(OECD, 2003).  This classification is only implemented for manufacturing.  While the OECD considers 
three services industries to be high technology (post/telecommunications, computers and R&D), we have 
only a small number of firms that can be considered high tech service firms.  Hence, we do not distinguish 
services firms into high and low tech.   
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Estimation results 
The baseline estimation results from probit regressions of equation (12) without 
the vector X are presented in Table 3 for firms in manufacturing industries.  Overall, we 
find broad empirical support for  hypotheses 1 to 3 stated above.   
 
Table 3: Baseline results: manufacturing sector 
 
 1 2 3 
Home λ -0.000155*** -0.000447*** -0.000336*** 
 (5.50e-05) (6.12e-05) (4.48e-05) 
Size 0.000261***   
 (3.07e-05)   
Size * Home λ -1.78e-05**   
 (7.48e-06)   
Labour intensity  5.35e-05  
  (4.70e-05)  
Labour intensity * 
Home λ 
 -2.73e-05**  
  (1.12e-05)  
TFP   7.56e-07*** 
   (1.64e-07) 
TFP * Home λ   -1.37e-07*** 
   (3.55e-08) 
Predicted probability 0.0005763 0.0006425 0.0006224 
Wald chi2 2473.21 1948.61 2286.47 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0377 0.0265 0.0303 
Log pseudolikelihood -33401.776 -30952.892                 -27790.138 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,622,640 5,031,298 4,588,294 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. 
 All explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
 All specifications include a full set of year and industry dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In column (1) we consider the role of firm heterogeneity in terms of firm size for 
the link between employment protection and relocation.  We find, as expected, that 
higher employment protection in the home country discourages firms’ relocation 
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activity.23
In columns (2) and (3) we consider the impact of the other firm characteristics 
included in our theoretical model, namely labour intensity and productivity, respectively.  
Results on the firm level variables and interaction terms again provide support for our 
expectation.  In particular, we find that while more productive firms are more likely to 
relocate, their propensity to relocate is significantly more mitigated by employment 
protection than their less productive counterparts’ relocation propensity.  Although our 
results for the manufacturing sector as a whole do not give support to our expectation that 
the more labour intensive firms are more likely to relocate, we do find that employment 
protection reduces the probability to relocate more for firms that are more labour 
intensive.   
  Also, larger firms are more likely to relocate activity.  As suggested by our 
theoretical model, the negative coefficient on the interaction of size * Home λ indicates 
that employment protection lowers the propensity to relocate more for firms that are 
large.   
In order to identify the effect of home country employment protection more 
appropriately, we report in Table 4 estimations which include the vector of control 
variables at the firm, home and destination country level as discussed above.  The results 
show that the inclusion of these variables does not change our findings on the importance 
of employment protection and its interaction with firm characteristics.   
 
 
                                                 
23 Since we report marginal effects, we can also comment on the economic importance of these effects.  
The overall probability of relocating in our sample is 0.058 percent (column 1).  An increase in Home λ by 
one unit (roughly equivalent to increasing employment protection from the level of Australia to that of 
France – see Table 1) increases the probability by 0. 016 percentage points.   
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Table 4: Estimations with additional covariates, manufacturing sector  
 
 1 2 3 
Home λ -0.000319*** -0.000548*** -0.000404*** 
 (8.93e-05) (8.18e-05) (6.77e-05) 
Size 0.000230***   
 (5.52e-05)   
Size * Home λ -1.90e-05   
 (1.32e-05)   
Labour intensity  4.72e-05  
  (5.89e-05)  
Labour intensity *Home λ  -2.58e-05*  
  (1.43e-05)  
TFP   1.65e-06*** 
   (5.08e-07) 
TFP * Home λ   -3.24e-07*** 
   (1.07e-07) 
Host λ 1.74e-07 4.18e-06 6.15e-06 
 (1.45e-05) (1.52e-05) (1.56e-05) 
Home tax rate 0.00130*** 0.00151*** 0.00164*** 
 (0.000358) (0.000366) (0.000373) 
Intangible to Total Assets 0.000276* 0.000474*** 0.000496*** 
 (0.000162) (0.000159) (0.000162) 
Average Wage 2.79e-08*** 1.12e-08** 7.03e-09 
 (3.79e-09) (4.34e-09) (5.58e-09) 
Predicted probability 0.0005758 0.0005977 0.0005916 
Wald chi2 1176.23 932.94 959.46 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0349 0.0281 0.0312 
Log pseudolikelihood -16250.427 -16122.849 -14902.945 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,834,904 2,810,382 2,591,694 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. 
 All explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
 All specifications include a full set of year and industry dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In order to check whether industry heterogeneity drives our results, we distinguish 
the manufacturing sector into high and low tech subsectors.  We present the results of re-
estimating the models on the separate sub-samples in Tables 5 and 6 for low and high 
tech manufacturing sectors, respectively.  
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Table 5: Manufacturing sector – Low tech sector (NACE 15-23, 25-28, 36-37) 
 
 1 2 3 
Home λ -0.000385*** -0.000659*** -0.000407*** 
 (0.000112) (0.000110) (8.63e-05) 
Size 0.000122*   
 (7.39e-05)   
Size * Home λ -3.09e-06   
 (1.77e-05)   
Labour intensity  0.000254***  
  (7.97e-05)  
Labour intensity *Home  
λ 
 -6.24e-05***  
  (1.90e-05)  
TFP   1.95e-07 
   (7.33e-07) 
TFP * Home λ   -2.92e-08 
   (1.54e-07) 
Host λ -2.99e-05 -2.73e-05 -2.46e-05 
 (1.87e-05) (1.92e-05) (1.95e-05) 
Intangible to Total 
Assets 
8.00e-05 0.000258 0.000397 
 (0.000262) (0.000254) (0.000259) 
Average Wage 3.66e-07*** 2.76e-07*** 2.72e-07*** 
 (3.37e-08) (3.96e-08) (3.50e-08) 
Tax rates 0.00123*** 0.00149*** 0.00146*** 
 (0.000385) (0.000389) (0.000390) 
Predicted probability 0.0005633 0.0005725 0.000554 
Wald chi2 712.86 704.62 715.83 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0324 0.0294 0.0319 
Log pseudolikelihood -8658.2476 -8575.3564 -7729.5616 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,586,158 1,570,480 1,445,726 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. 
 All explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
 All specifications include a full set of year and industry dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The tables show that the results on the importance of firm heterogeneity hold in 
both sub-sectors, albeit with some important differences.  We find in both sub-sectors 
negative and statistically significant effects of employment protection on the probability 
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to relocate.  However,  with regard to the importance of the firm-specific characteristics, 
we find some interesting differences.  
Starting with low tech manufacturing, it is the degree of labour intensity −rather 
than size or productivity− that induces firms to relocate abroad; firms that are more 
labour intensive are more likely to relocate.  This is consistent with the estimated 
coefficient for firms’ average wage level, indicating that firms with a higher average 
wage are more likely to relocate.  It is also in line with our theoretical model in which 
firm relocate in search of cheap labour and are therefore more likely to do so when they 
are relatively labour intensive.  Importantly, we find confirmation for our hypothesis that 
employment protection will hinder these labour-intensive firms more than their more 
capital intensive counterparts, as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on the 
interaction term employment protection and labour intensity.   
Turning to high skill manufacturing, we find that for these sectors productivity 
and size are crucial in determining the propensity to relocate. Clearly, the search for 
cheap labour is not the driving force for relocation for these firms, which is reflected in 
the fact that the coefficient on labour intensity and average wages are negative.  This 
suggests that, unlike in low tech manufacturing sectors, the type of labour hired by these 
firms is highly skilled and highly productive.  In fact, more productive, larger firms are 
significantly more likely to relocate while they are also the ones that are most hampered 
by employment protection.   
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Table 6: Manufacturing sector – High tech sector (NACE 24, 29-35) 
 
 1 2 3 
Home λ -0.000295** -0.000428*** -0.000422*** 
 (0.000139) (0.000122) (0.000110) 
Size 0.000328***   
 (7.89e-05)   
Size *Home  λ -3.11e-05*   
 (1.88e-05)   
Labour intensity  -0.000165**  
  (7.96e-05)  
Labour intensity *Home  
λ 
 2.12e-05  
  (1.97e-05)  
TFP   2.86e-06*** 
   (4.63e-07) 
TFP * Home λ   -5.89e-07*** 
   (1.01e-07) 
Host λ 2.84e-05 3.69e-05 3.62e-05 
 (2.18e-05) (2.37e-05) (2.45e-05) 
Intangible to Total 
Assets 
0.000292 0.000549*** 0.000505** 
 (0.000205) (0.000212) (0.000215) 
Average Wage -4.23e-08 -3.84e-07*** -5.99e-07*** 
 (3.23e-08) (1.33e-07) (2.24e-07) 
Tax rates 0.00192** 0.00217** 0.00255*** 
 (0.000769) (0.000850) (0.000882) 
Predicted probability 0.0005545 0.0005995 0.0006075 
Wald chi2 809.51 584.81 614.32 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0514 0.0378 0.0416 
Log pseudolikelihood -7473.5387 -7450.1291 -7078.6361 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,238,160 1,229,316 1,139,134 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. 
 All explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
 All specifications include a full set of year and industry dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 Although relocation in services has been increasing, it is still relatively low 
and seems to be concentrated in a small number of subsectors (e.g., Cohen, 2005).  Since 
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we have information on firms in services sectors, we separately ran probit models of 
equation (12) for firms in services sectors.  The results are presented in Table 7.   
 Employment protection in the source country has the expected negative 
effect, implying that employment protection also acts as a barrier to exit for firms in 
services.  However, when we look at firm characteristics, size, labour intensity and 
productivity hardly seem to matter as determinants of a firms’ propensity to relocate. 
While this may not be too surprising (as our theoretical model was set up to capture 
relocation decisions in manufacturing rather than services), it also suggests that relocation 
motives for firms in services are very different from those in manufacturing (for instance, 
market presence and proximity to consumers may be important for services).  
Nevertheless, even for relocation decisions of these firms, employment protection seems 
to be a significant barrier to exit.   
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper examines the determinants of the decision to relocate activities abroad 
for MNEs that are located in 29 OECD countries.  Particular attention is paid to source-
country employment protection as a barrier to exit.  For all sectors we find that stricter 
employment protection in the home country discourages firms’ relocation.  Highly labour 
intensive firms in low-skill manufacturing and large, highly productive firms in high-skill 
manufacturing have, ceteris paribus, higher propensities to relocate.  Precisely these 
firms are, as suggested by our theoretical model, hampered most in their relocation 
decisions by home country employment protection.  For firms in services, employment 
protection also seems to act as a barrier to exit for firms in services.  However, size, 
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labour intensity and productivity hardly seem to matter for relocation decisions of firms 
in services.   
 
Table 7: Estimation results for firms in services sector (NACE 50-74) 
 
 1 2 3 
Home λ -0.000528*** -0.000260*** -0.000318*** 
 (7.96e-05) (8.20e-05) (7.85e-05) 
Size -2.66e-05   
 (3.47e-05)   
Size * Home λ 3.94e-05***   
 (8.36e-06)   
Labour intensity  -0.000176***  
  (3.40e-05)  
Labour intensity * Home 
λ 
 3.65e-05***  
  (8.20e-06)  
TFP   -6.30e-09 
   (4.14e-09) 
TFP *Home  λ   1.54e-09* 
   (9.17e-10) 
Host λ -6.41e-06 1.43e-05 -4.30e-06 
 (1.57e-05) (1.63e-05) (1.64e-05) 
Intangible to Total Assets -0.000825*** -0.000525*** -0.000448*** 
 (0.000153) (0.000156) (0.000158) 
Average Wage 3.19e-08*** 2.08e-08*** 1.96e-08*** 
 (3.56e-09) (4.39e-09) (4.39e-09) 
Tax rates -0.000310 -0.000442 -9.85e-05 
 (0.000478) (0.000493) (0.000489) 
Predicted probability 0.000893 0.0009122 0.0008861 
Wald chi2 2049.20 1795.29 1399.96 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0274 0.0251 0.0204 
Log pseudolikelihood -32282.678 -30582.42 -29240.374 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,937,188 3,716,356 3,692,504 
Notes: Coefficients are shown as marginal effects. 
 All explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
 All specifications include a full set of year and industry dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, our theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that the relationship 
between labour market rigidities and foreign direct investment is more complex than 
generally postulated in the literature.  In particular, we show that employment protection 
 32 
in the home country matters, while most earlier work focuses on what happens in the host 
country.  From a policy point of view, our results suggest that countries with strict 
employment protection may be in a stronger position to slow down the exit of large, 
productive and highly labour intensive firms than their counterparts with lax employment 
protection laws.  This matters when one bears in mind the social adjustment costs that are 
potentially associated with industry relocation. 
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Empirical Appendix 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
Firm size is measured using the natural logarithm of employees (Source: Orbis) 
 
λ is the Employment protection index (Source: World Economic Forum)  
 
Labour intensity is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of labour to capital, 
where capital is measured by fixed assets (Source: Orbis) 
 
Average Wage is calculated by dividing a firm’s total wage bill by the number of 
employees (Source: Orbis) 
 
Total factor productivity estimated using the approach described in Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003)  
 
IATA is calculated as the ratio of intangible assets over total assets (Source: Orbis) 
 
Rates of tax on income, profits and corporate gains (Source: World Economic Forum) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
